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Abstract Far from being unwelcome or impossible in a mathematical set-
ting, indeterminacy in various forms can be seen as playing an important role
in driving mathematical research forward by providing “sources of newness”
in the sense of [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)]. I argue here that mathematical co-
incidences, phenomena recently under discussion in the philosophy of math-
ematics, are usefully seen as inducers of indeterminacy and as put to work
in guiding research directions. I suggest that to call a pair of mathematical
facts (merely) a coincidence is roughly to suggest that the investigation of
connections between these facts isn’t worthwhile. To say of this pair, “That’s
no coincidence!” is to suggest just the opposite. I further argue that this per-
spective on mathematical coincidence, which pays special attention to what
mathematical coincidences do, may provide us with a better view of what
mathematical coincidences are than extant accounts. I close by reflecting on
how understanding mathematical coincidences as generating indeterminacy
accords with a conception of mathematical research as ultimately aiming to
reduce indeterminacy and complexity to triviality as proposed in [Rota(1997)].
Keywords indeterminacy · mathematical coincidence · mathematical
practice
1 Introduction
Cantor’s paradise1 (and the world of mathematics more generally) has seemed
to many to mirror Dante’s Paradise, where “law eternal” ordains that “no
trace of chance can find a place.”2 However, mathematical coincidences or “ac-
cidents,” phenomena recently under discussion in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics, threaten to disturb the idyllic bliss by injecting traces of the unexplained
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA
1 [Hilbert(1926/1983), 191]
2 [Dante, Paradiso, Canto XXXII, 52-56]
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and unordained into paradise.3 This emergence of apparent disorder needn’t
be seen as wholly unwelcome, however. Like Achilles in the Underworld,4 some
may find the unchanging, fully-determined nature of so-called paradise unin-
spiring and so pine for any source of something new. In what follows, I’ll argue
for taking this Achillean point of view on mathematical coincidences and the
way they can—by drawing attention to a kind of indeterminacy—be “sources
of newness” and motivators of mathematical investigation.5
More specifically, the plan for the paper is as follows. I’ll begin in Sec-
tion 2 by discussing some of the roles indeterminacy can play in inquiry in
general and of the mathematical variety in particular. This discussion will be
forced to find a sense of ‘indeterminacy’ that doesn’t clash with the presumed
exact and unchanging nature of mathematical reality. Next, in Section 3, I’ll
present a few examples that will introduce the concept of a mathematical co-
incidence. These examples will then be used to argue for an understanding
of mathematical coincidences as sources of indeterminacy and newness that
can motivate mathematical research in Section 4. When we look at what we
do when we call something a mathematical coincidence rather than ask what
it is for something to be a mathematical coincidence, an alternative to the
standard account of the phenomenon ([Lange(2017), Ch. 8]), which will come
up for discussion in Section 5, suggests itself. According to this alternative
view, to call a pair of mathematical facts (merely) a coincidence is roughly
to suggest that attention to how these facts are related would not be fruitful;
to say, “That’s no coincidence!” is to suggest just the opposite. Expanding on
this basic picture and responding to some of the most obvious objections to it
will be the project of the latter portion of Section 4 and Section 6 respectively.
2 A Sense of ‘Indeterminacy’
John Dewey famously characterizes inquiry as the transformation of an inde-
terminate situation into one “that is so determinate in its constituent distinc-
tions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into
a unified whole.”6 Here, a “situation” is deemed to be indeterminate when
its constituent parts don’t “hang together”; when it presents itself as open
for questioning or as being uncertain; when the future of the situation can’t
be predicted or clearly made out; and when it “tends to evoke discordant re-
sponses” from those encountering it.7 The full details of Dewey’s view aren’t
important for present purposes, but what is important for the project of the
3 On mathematical coincidence, see, e.g., [Baker(2009)], [Lange(2010)], and [Lange(2017),
Ch. 8]. See also [Davis(1981)].
4 [Homer, Odyssey 11.487-503]
5 The idea of “sourcing newness” is drawn from [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)].
6 [Dewey(1938), 104-105, emphasis in the original]
7 See [Dewey(1938), 105-106]. Dewey’s use of ‘indeterminate situation’ in this semi-
technical sense helps block Russell’s “counterexample” that, according to Dewey, a brick-
layer’s dealings with a pile of bricks is a form of inquiry [Russell(1946/1961), 823]. See
[Gale(1959)] for more on Russell on Dewey on inquiry.
Indeterminacy, Coincidence, and “Sourcing Newness” in Mathematical Research 3
paper is the implication in Dewey’s thinking that inquiry is premised on the
existence of the appropriate sort of indeterminacy. If this line of thought is
on the right track, we might expect, as Michael Hutter and Ignacio Faŕıas
have found, that “inducing” indeterminacy can serve as a way to “source new-
ness” and advance an art, an industry, or a science by generating new sites for
inquiry.8
Some examples of induced indeterminacy from the work of Hutter and
Faŕıas include attempts to suspend particular social norms or expectations
within the artist’s studio;9 forcing the “transcription” of aspects of a star like
Joan Crawford into the new, animated form of Snow White’s Evil Queen; and
aiming to disrupt accepted valuations through various forms of critique.10 In
each case, there is an aim to create conditions of uncertainty and indeterminacy
out of which something new may be hoped to emerge via the subsequent
engagement and inquiry.
Mathematical uses of ‘determinacy’ and ‘indeterminacy’ are familiar enough:
y = x2 determines a value of y given a value for x, but y 6= x2 doesn’t;11
limx→0 sinx/x is an indeterminate form since limx→0 sinx = limx→0 x = 0;
12
R[X] is a ring of polynomials in indeterminate X;13 etc. But it’s also com-
mon enough for the kinds of indeterminacy discussed by Hutter and Faŕıas to
find their place in mathematical settings. For example, although this reading
doesn’t capture his own intentions, the investigations of Saccheri into Eu-
clidean geometry without the parallel postulate can be seen as relaxing a
framework of rules to increase indeterminacy and allow something new—non-
Euclidean geometry—to emerge.14 Adding an axiom to an existing base system
can also be seen as allowing an experiment in indeterminacy in the other di-
rection: e.g., what happens if we restrict our set theories by adopting new rules
in the form of the Axiom of Constructibility or the Axiom of Determinacy?15
Part of the fruitfulness of category theory comes from the ability of functors
to “transcribe” objects from one category to another; e.g., a topological object
can be transported into an algebraic category by the fundamental group func-
tor.16 And criticizing and critiquing, say, foundations or logics, often serves to
make room for reevaluation of how determinate our fundamental assumptions
8 [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)]
9 Something like this induced indeterminacy may also be familiar as what the character
Paul aims to produce in his rented apartment in Last Tango in Paris.
10 [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017), 438-440, 441-442, 444]
11 See [Wittgenstein(1953/2009), §189] for discussion of this sense of ‘determinacy.’
12 See, e.g., [Bartle and Sherbert(2011), Section 6.3].
13 See, e.g., [Mac Lane and Birkhoff(1999), Ch. III.6].
14 See [Saccheri(1733/2014), Book I].
15 See [Corfield(2003), 152] for more on the role of axioms in experimentation and creativity
within mathematical research.
16 Cf. [Hatcher(2002), 21]: “Algebraic topology can be roughly defined as the study of tech-
niques for forming algebraic images of topological spaces.” See also the notion of “transport
of structure” from [Bourbaki(1968), Ch. IV, §1].
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and frameworks ultimately are.17 The reevaluation and critique of accepted
valuations and conceptualizations as a stimulus for mathematical research has
also been noted at least since the work of Lakatos.18 The importance of and
role played by this Lakatosian variety of indeterminacy and “open texture”
in the sense of [Waismann(1945), 123f.] has reemerged in recent discussions
of formal vs. informal mathematics,19 as well as in attempts to tie the or-
dinary practice of refining and homing in on mathematical concepts to the
contemporary interest in “conceptual engineering.”20 Both of these natural
connections further place the sense of ‘indeterminacy’ especially focused on
by Hutter and Faŕıas squarely within traditional bounds of research in the
philosophy of mathematics.21
The instances of indeterminacy in mathematical settings above are all ana-
logues of examples given in [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)], but the typology can
readily be expanded as well. Consider the following reminiscence of Vaughan
Jones (of Jones polynomial fame) discussing an experience which he used to
“dislike intensely,” but has. . .
. . .come to appreciate and even search for. It is the situation where one
has two watertight, well-designed arguments that lead inexorably to
opposite conclusions. Remember that research in mathematics involves
a foray into the unknown. We may not know which of the two conclu-
sions is correct or even have any feeling or guess. [. . .] The search for
a chink in the armour often involve[s] many tricks including elaborate
thought experiments and perhaps computer calculations. Much struc-
tural understanding is created, which is why I now so value this process
[Jones(1998), 208-209, emphasis added].22
Jones describes here a situation where the vacillation of trust in each of his “wa-
tertight” arguments and in the consistency of mathematics as a whole creates
an uncomfortable indeterminacy that leads to new understanding and knowl-
edge.23 The example, therefore, fits in nicely with those presented so far, which
are more closely tied to those originally given in [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)].
17 This is one way to view the resurgence of interest in type-theory and
constructive logic initiated by the so-called univalent foundations program. See
[Univalent Foundations Program(2013)].
18 See, e.g., [Lakatos(1976)].
19 See [Shapiro and Roberts(2021)] for discussion of open texture and mathematics more
generally.
20 See [Tanswell(2018)] for a compelling case that the project of conceptual engineering
has much to learn from mathematical practice. See, e.g., [Burgess et al.(2020)] for a general
introduction to the conceptual engineering project.
21 Of course, none of this indeterminacy quite suggests the kind of “ontologi-
cal indeterminacy” investigated in more metaphysically-focused literature: see, e.g.,
[Rosen and Smith(2004)] or [Barnes and Williams(2011)] for more on this purported type
of indeterminacy. (See, e.g., [Lewis(1986), 212] for the ‘purported’ qualification.)
22 In addition to indeterminacy, Jones suggests that this kind of situation also “induces
obsessive and anti-social behaviour.”
23 See [Aberdein(2010)] for an attempt to mine the mistaken half of this kind of argument
pair for a deeper understanding of mathematical error, mathematical fallacies, and the role
of and justification for informal reasoning in mathematics.
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Clearly, this is a fairly brief account of how indeterminacy in the sense of
Dewey and Hutter and Faŕıas finds its place in the setting of mathematics.
Despite the brevity of these remarks, however, the examples do suggest that
there’s reason to think that inducing indeterminacy in at least this sense can
be an important engine driving new mathematical research forward. And from
there, it’s clear enough how mathematical coincidences might usefully be seen
as presenting us with indeterminacy in Dewey’s sense as well: when two (or
more) mathematical facts are thought to be coincidental, they don’t “hang
together” in any obvious way; there’s a kind of unpredictability about how
the facts might be related—if they ever are; and different responses to the
juxtaposition of these facts are characteristically evoked. After presenting a
few examples that illustrate the concept of a mathematical coincidence in the
next section, I’ll expand on this initial characterization of the indeterminacy
induced by mathematical coincidences in Section 4.
3 A budget of coincidences
As mentioned in Section 1, mathematicians and philosophers have noticed
the surprising fact that within mathematical practice facts or collections of
facts are regularly classified as being “coincidental” (or not).24 The following
examples are just a small sampling of this phenomenon.25
Example 1. The thirteenth decimal digit of both π and e is 9.26
π = 3. 1 4 1 5 9 2 6 5 3 5 8 9 7 . . .
e = 2. 7 1 8 2 8 1 8 2 8 4 5 9 0 . . .
Is this a coincidence? Presumably, yes.
Example 2. 1!, 2!, . . . , 400! are all “Niven” (or “harshad”) numbers.
That is, each is divisible by the sum of its decimal digits.27 Are all
natural numbers Niven numbers or is it just a coincidence that the first
∼400 turn out to be?
All natural numbers are not Niven numbers. 432! is the first coun-
terexample. The sum of the digits of 432! is 32 · 433. Since 432! =
432 · 431 · . . . · 2 · 1, and 433 is prime, 432! doesn’t have 433 as a factor.
24 Another way talk of coincidence can arise in mathematics is when a bad argument
“coincidentally” reaches a true conclusion. As [Aberdein(2010)] shows, this kind of coinci-
dence can be usefully investigated, but it is not of the type central to recent discussions of
mathematical coincidence, so I’ll set it aside in what follows.
25 So-called “monstrous moonshine” [Conway and Norton(1979)] is another more famous
and much more complicated source of examples of surprising (non)coincidences relating facts
about finite groups and modular functions. See, e.g., [Gannon(2006)].
26 [Davis(1981), 312]
27 [Guy(1990), 10]
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Example 3. Each of the following is a prime number: 31, 331, 3331,
33331, 333331, 3333331, 33333331.28
Are all numbers of the form 3 . . . 31 prime? Again, the answer is no.
It’s only a coincidence that the first several instances of numbers of
this form are prime. 333333331 = 17 · 19607843, for example.
Example 2 and Example 3 naturally prompt questions about whether we can
determine if an n will be a Niven number or if
3 . . . 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
1
is prime just by looking at n. Example 1, however, doesn’t obviously raise
questions that might be usefully investigated, which may lead us to classify it
as not merely a coincidence, but as a “mere” coincidence.
Example 4. Choose a “normal” three-digit number (i.e., aside from
111, 222, . . .), say, 713. Subtract the number that results from arrang-
ing its digits in ascending order from the number that results from
arranging its digits in descending order: 731 − 137 = 594. Repeat this
process again with the result: 954 − 459 = 495. And again with 495:
954 − 459 = 495. Choosing a few other initial numbers also yields
a repeating 495 after several iterations of this operation—a so-called
Kaprekar operation.29 Will we end up with 495 regardless of the three-
digit number we start with or are these results just a matter of coinci-
dence?
It can be shown that 495 is the unique fixed point of the Kaprekar
operation applied to normal three-digit numbers and that all normal
three-digit numbers eventually reach the fixed point (in six steps or
fewer), so this is no coincidence.30 To find the fixed point, consider the
following. Each iteration of the Kaprekar operation has the following
form, where 0 ≤ c ≤ b ≤ a ≤ 9.
a b c
− c b a
A B C
And the relations between a, b, c and A,B,C can be seen to be the
following.
C = 10 + c− a
B = 10 + b− 1− b = 9
A = a− 1− c
28 [Guy(1988), 699]
29 This operation is named after Dattathreya Kaprekar, who studied it and discovered a
number of facts about it. See, e.g., [Kaprekar(1955)]. Kaprekar also gave the name ‘harshad’
to the harshad numbers in Example 2.
30 For four-digit numbers, the operation always ends with 6174. Neither two-digit nor
five-digit numbers have a repeating value (or “kernel”). See [Nishiyama(2012), 370].
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Since we’re looking for a fixed point of this operation, we need A,B,C
to be some permutation of a, b, c. There are six possible permutations,
but only (A,B,C) = (c, a, b) solves the equations. And for this per-
mutation, (a, b, c) = (9, 5, 4). That is, applying the Kaprekar oper-
ation in the form of 954 − 459 results in the fixed point of 495.31
[Eldridge and Sagong(1988)] further shows that for any three-digit num-
ber in base r, the Kaprekar operation must reach the fixed point(
r − 2
2
, r − 1, r
2
)
just in case r is even.
Example 4 leads to at least the following natural question: For which n does the
Kaprekar operation applied to length-n numbers terminate in a single value?
And is there a reason that certain length numbers behave this way under the
operation or is it merely coincidental that, e.g., three- and four-digit numbers
have a fixed point but five-digit numbers do not?
Philosophers of mathematics have been interested in mathematical coin-
cidences like these largely because they seem to present us with a puzzle:
everything in mathematics is necessary, so it’s not clear what sense could
be made of there being mathematical coincidences or anything accidental in
mathematics at all.32 I hope to show in what follows, however, that if we pay
more attention to the role the concept of a coincidence plays in mathematical
practice—in particular to the ways in which mathematical coincidences can
be used to “induce indeterminacy”—coincidences in mathematics needn’t be
seen as being inherently puzzling or problematic.
4 Mathematical Coincidences as Inducing Indeterminacy
As I suggested at the end of Section 2, it’s natural to see the examples of
mathematical coincidence offered in Section 3 as presenting us with indeter-
minacy in Dewey’s sense; e.g., facts about the decimal representations of π
and e don’t seem to hang together in any sense; there’s no way to predict
how these facts could ultimately be connected; and noting that some of the
decimal digits of π and e coincide naturally enough evokes different responses
(e.g., some might say there’s nothing more to be said here; some may think
it points to something further to be discovered—perhaps that these digits co-
incide roughly every ten digits or something similar33). But I’ve also claimed
31 A similar procedure can be used to show that 6174 is the fixed point of the Kaprekar
operation applied to normal four-digit numbers. See [Nishiyama(2012), 364-365].
32 This may also suggest, as [Fine(1994)] has argued regarding essence, that necessity is too
“coarse-grained” of a notion to capture the phenomena and so an account of coincidences
as not stemming from the “essences” of the objects involved is needed instead. Taking this
line would produce a rather different view than the one to be investigated here, and will
have to wait for another opportunity to be explored in any case.
33 See [Davis(1981), 312-313].
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the mathematical coincidences can serve as “sources of newness” and “induc-
ers of indeterminacy” to use the phraseology from [Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)].
In what way might this be the case?
When a mathematician first asks whether two or more mathematical facts
are coincidental, attention is drawn to the fact that we don’t have a way of
connecting these facts to one another: there’s no path from the one to the
other(s) in a sense. Making this disconnect clear also makes clear that what
might be said to get us from the one fact to the other(s) is not something that’s
yet settled, and so may be properly thought of as generating a new indeter-
minacy to be investigated. If we take mathematical coincidences to indicate
a kind of indeterminacy in connections between mathematical facts that fail
to “hang together” and so on in this way, they can also be seen as sources of
the indeterminacy that pushes creativity and research forward as discussed in
Section 2. It should be noted right away, however, that this highlighted inde-
terminacy and the attempts at its resolution aren’t to be understood as a kind
of anything-goes chaos. Rather they should be seen as placing the mathemati-
cian in a familiar constrained, but unsettled kind of situation familiar across
various forms of inquiry and research. Consider the following comparison. In
his Confessions, Augustine recounts the story of being part of a competition
as a boy that asked a group of students to rewrite the angry speech of Juno
from Book I of The Aeneid in prose. “The contest was to be won by the boy
who found the best words to suit the meaning and best expressed the feelings
of the sorrow and anger appropriate to the majesty of” Juno.34 If we take a
question such as, “What is the best way to render Juno’s speech into prose?” a
determinate answer wouldn’t be expected, and it would be odd to suspect that
there is a single best answer waiting to be discovered. Surely the judges would
at least have some appropriate wordings in mind and would have had some
sense of what a winning submission might look like, but the contest would not
be the type of contest it was if they had fully specified the conditions under
which an entry would win in advance. Part of what makes such a competition
interesting for all those involved must be the learning about what good an-
swers look like through pursuing an answer and through judging both good
and bad attempts at providing one. Similarly, if mathematical coincidences
induce indeterminacy in the sense of Dewey, we may see them as posing the
question, “What is the best way to get from fact A to fact B?” By the nature
of the case, we won’t be able to predict how A and B end up connected (if
they are ever connected), but that doesn’t mean that anything at all can be
put in place to do the connecting.
This understanding of connecting unconnected mathematical facts comes
close to committing to the view that mathematics is created not discovered,
but the view under consideration here needn’t go that far globally.35 Even if
34 See [Augustine(1961), I.xvii]. Cf. the fairy tale discussed by Wittgenstein and cited in
[Säätelä(2011), 173], where the prince asks a smith to bring him a “hubbub.”
35 See [Muntersbjorn(2003)] for an argument that this is a false dilemma anyway. Munters-
bjorn argues that mathematics is best thought of as being “cultivated” rather than invented
or discovered.
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it did though, the problems involved with taking such a position often seem to
be exaggerated. From the perspective of trying to take the facts of mathemati-
cal practice adequately into account, mathematicians themselves may be more
inclined to describe certain developments in terms of creations rather than as
discoveries.36 Insisting that everything in mathematics must count as being
discovered also commonly fails to distinguish between that which is eventu-
ally seen as being there from that which is somehow already there waiting
to be found. These general remarks could be justified from a perspective on
mathematics along the lines of Wittgenstein’s,37 but they can also be seen as
simple descriptions of the realities of mathematical practice.38 Since capturing
mathematical practice in relation to mathematical coincidence is my primary
goal here, I only want to claim that the understanding of how the pieces of a
mathematical coincidence may come to be connected discussed so far is not in
conflict with that practice: there’s no doubt that mathematicians do regularly
forge connections between different areas of research and disparate facts.
Noting these facts about the role of coincidence in mathematical practice
may even help us understand the phenomenon more than a direct attempt at
an analysis or definition would. In fact, the examples considered so far suggest
a view along the following lines. In one of his so-called minor works, The Art
of Persuasion, Pascal suggests that God wants divine truths to enter our lives
by proceeding from the heart to the mind, not the other way around.
[T]he saints [. . .] say, in speaking of things divine, that we must love
them in order to know them.39
The beginning of an account that will be presented below might be called “Pas-
calian” in the sense that it suggests that our talk of mathematical coincidence
is most appropriately seen as being involved in making us love mathematics
in a way that leads us to mathematical knowledge and understanding. Even
in this abstract domain, we need a loving guide to lead us along the path to
knowledge.40
Other sciences can rely more on human needs and necessities to push for-
ward investigation and research: new diseases come along; the climate changes;
people demand faster computers; etc. Some of the science involved in these
pursuits will push mathematics forward as well obviously: in order to build a
36 Cf. [Gowers(2011)] and the commentary in [Rosen(2011)].
37 See, e.g., [Wittgenstein(1930/1975), §158] and [Wittgenstein(1956/1983), I §168].
38 See, e.g., [Martin(2020), §5.1].
39 “[L]es saints [. . .] disent en parlant des choses divines qu’il faut les aimer pour les
connâıtre.”
40 Note that [Guy(1988), 698], e.g., disagrees with this kind of view. He suggests that
early coincidences like the ones seen in Example 2 and 3 above are actually “the enemy
of mathematical discovery” since they tend to send us on wild goose chases for proofs of
theorems that are simply false. Of course, I’m not suggesting that there is some kind of
foolproof path to successful mathematical discovery. In any given case, the mathematician
will have to rely on background knowledge, experience, intuition, and so on to determine
whether a direction of research suggested by a mathematical coincidence is worth the time
and effort. My point is that these coincidences are useful ways of inducing indeterminacy
that can spur research, not that they’re the only guide available.
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better bridge, you need to understand, say, some geometry, differential equa-
tions, and so on. Even the purest number theory can sometimes be driven
forward by real-world applications such as the modern need for encryption on-
line as well. But there’s plenty of mathematics that certainly does not now and
may never have real-world applications or be used to solve practical human
problems. If we think that the general practice of mathematics is a worthwhile
and significant human endeavor that needn’t be justified in terms of applica-
tions, we need to continue finding ways to generate particular interest in it and
even love for it.41 One way of creating this kind of care, which we find in ordi-
nary mathematical discourse already, is putting forward a given mathematical
fact or group of facts as being no coincidence.42 To make a claim like this is a
way of both helping to generate an indeterminate situation in Dewey’s sense
that is open for inquiry and suggesting that there might be something worthy
of interest there—something that’s of interest independently of anything else
that might make a piece of mathematics worth caring about. Similarly, saying
that something is just (or merely) a coincidence is a way of directing atten-
tion away from the indeterminacy felt between the facts and suggesting that
this is not something worth spending time on.43 (The examples presented in
Section 3 elicited these very sorts of reactions and judgments.) These kinds of
evaluative judgments should be seen in a real sense as essential to the practice
of mathematics. We don’t have unlimited time or resources, so we need to
focus attention on one area or problem rather than another now and then; re-
searchers need to get other people interested in their problems to sustain their
work, to get grants and postdocs; and so on. Talking in terms of mathematical
coincidence is one way of contributing to the doing of all this work.
To see this kind of interest-generating role for mathematical coincidence
in action in another simple case, consider the following pair of “worm-eaten
arithmetic” problems.44
    
×     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
    
×     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 4
41 Seeing the ways in which “[m]athematics is for human flourishing” [Su(2020), 10, em-
phasis added] is another route to this same end.
42 Although he wouldn’t agree with the details of the Pascalian view presented here, Marc
Lange, e.g., agrees that coincidence talk can sometimes make it easier to recognize interesting
issues. See [Lange(2010), 331].
43 Lange very briefly discusses and dismisses a view like this which holds that a coincidence
“does not repay further study, it is not fruitful, it leads to no further interesting mathemat-
ics” [Lange(2017), 286]. (He also suggests that Roy Sorensen makes a proposal like this in an
unpublished manuscript, “Mathematical Coincidences.”) I’ll discuss Lange’s view further in
Section 5 and comment on how the proposal under consideration differs from this dismissed
one there as well.
44 [Nishiyama(2012), 372]
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Each of these problems is solvable by the same method,45 but due to the
coincidence that the product arrived at in the first is 123456789, we can expect
there to be a natural desire to find the answer, while 123456784 is somehow
less exciting. I don’t want to claim that the difference in interest is very great
here at all or that the problem is itself of any great significance. However, I
do claim that such a difference in interest is there nonetheless (as attested to
in [Nishiyama(2012), 372]), and that fact is worth trying to understand.
There are a few other related roles that talk of coincidence in mathematics
often plays and which are worth mentioning here as well before reaching a
general summary of the view. Although these roles are clearly important, they
are the sort of roles that philosophers of mathematics can be slow to pay
attention to. The first is the fact relevant to mathematical pedagogy that
presenting a new piece of mathematics as a case for which there’s a question
about whether or not a coincidence is involved can motivate students to learn
the fact better as they do the work required to find out the answer on their
own. There are numerous studies in the cognitive science literature and the
literature on mathematics education that bear out the effectiveness of this
approach.46 One important part of mathematical practice is the training of
new generations of mathematicians, and noticing and making use of the effect
that this style of presentation can have on students seems to be a wise thing
to do. Generally, seeing mathematical coincidence talk as essentially aimed
at creating or dissolving a certain kind of care can play an important role in
taking this kind of fact about pedagogy into proper consideration.
The idea that talk of mathematical coincidence can play an effective role
in mathematical education is supported by the fact that in mathematical text-
books the most common use of ‘coincidence’ is in the context of saying that
something is “no coincidence.”47 This is a way of saying that the facts pre-
sented so far may seem to be merely coincidental, but that one ought to “stay
tuned” for a more satisfying story. The use of coincidence talk plays a different,
but still central, role in research-level mathematics. In contrast to textbook
writing, a search for the word ‘coincidence’ on MathOverflow, “a question and
answer site for professional mathematicians,”48 reveals that the term occurs
most often by far in the context of questions of the form, “Is it a coincidence
that X?” Discussions of “eventual counterexamples” on the site are also ger-
45 123456789 = 32 · 3607 · 3803 = 10821 · 11409 and 123456784 = 24 · 112 · 43 · 1483 =
10406 · 11864.
46 See, for example, [Buchbinder and Zaslavsky(2011)] and [Diaconis and Mosteller(1989),
859].
47 For examples of this in a few popular textbooks across a variety of disciplines
consider, e.g., [Artin(1991), 233], [Axler(1997), 177], [Dummit and Foote(2004), 55], and
[Spivak(1994), 199, 528], where this kind of language only turns up in “no coincidnce” (or
“no accident”) contexts.
48 <https://mathoverflow.net/tour> Accessed 25 March 2021. See [Martin and
Pease(2013)] for some reflections on MathOverflow as a resource and the light it sheds
on the production of mathematics.
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mane here.49 An ‘eventual counterexample’ is a counterexample to a general
principle that holds long enough for one to conjecture that it holds in general.
E.g., the factors of xn− 1 for n ≤ 100 all have coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. It was
conjectured that this would be the case for all n.50 The theorem “[i]f n has at
most two odd prime divisors, then the coefficients of Φn(x) [the n
th cyclotomic
polynomial] are in {−1, 0, 1},”51 and the fact the dth cylcotomic polynomials
where d is a divisor of n are the factors of xn−1 shows that it’s no accident that
the factors’ coefficients lie in {−1, 0, 1}—no number ≤ 100 has more than two
distinct prime factors. The conjecture doesn’t hold for all n, however, since,
e.g., x105−1 has Φ105 = Φ3·5·7 as a factor and this polynomial has a coefficient
of 2 in it. (It’s worth adding this example to those given in Section 3 because it
highlights the way aspects of both coincidence and noncoincidence often show
up in these sorts of cases. The fact that the conjecture doesn’t hold for all n
makes it a coincidence that it holds for the first hundred or so cases, but it’s no
coincidence that it held for each of those.) Asking whether or not something
is a coincidence on a forum like MathOverflow appears to be one useful way of
gauging whether other mathematicians find the particular fact worth investi-
gating and of generating the kind of attention needed for progress to be made.
(E.g., noting the facts mentioned above about the factors of xn−1 did lead to
further interest and investigation on MathOverflow subsequently.52) This kind
of sparked-interest can play the role of prompting other researchers to get in-
volved in the assembly and correlation of answers to other non-why-questions
from which answers to coincidence-related why-questions tend to emerge.53,54
Finally, and I hope not too fancifully, it’s easy when trying to engage in
the sometimes cold, objective observation of a science to forget that people
study mathematics and pursue mathematical research for the unique kinds of
pleasures that can be obtained in such pursuits. There’s beauty to be appre-
ciated in certain proofs and there’s enjoyment to be had in observing certain
kinds of cleverness in mathematics that are specific to the practice and worth
pursuing for their own sake. One further kind of enjoyment that one can ex-
perience when engaging in this kind of work is wondering whether something
is a coincidence or not and then having the question settled.55 This kind of
49 <https://mathoverflow.net/questions/15444/examples-of-eventual-counterexamples>
Accessed 29 August 2021.
50 <https://mathoverflow.net/a/15506> Accessed 29 August 2021.
51 See, e.g., [Brookfield(2016), 186].
52 <https://mathoverflow.net/questions/109149/cyclotomic-polynomials-with-
coefficients-0-pm1> Accessed 29 August 2021.
53 Cf. Sylvain Bromberger’s advice to someone seeking an answer to a why-question: “My
guess is that the rational thing for him to do is to forget about the why-question and to
turn to other questions instead, remembering that answers to why-questions usually emerge
from work on questions with more reliable credentials” [Bromberger(1992), 169].
54 See [Martin and Pease(2013)] for more on this “fact-gathering”-role played by Math-
Overflow.
55 Note that this kind of question can be settled without coming to the conclusion that it’s
true or false that X is a coincidence. One way of settling the question would be to come to
the opinion that the fact isn’t interesting and so just a coincidence or that it is interesting
and so is no mere coincidence.
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resolution can come about through new research or can be put before you
by someone writing an article or textbook. This kind of pleasure is similar
to one that one finds in reading certain works of fiction. Many people have
had the experience of reading Dickens, e.g., Martin Chuzzlewit, and having the
thought, “Ah, another very convenient coincidence, Charles!” But of course
one needn’t respond to the book that way. One might also wonder whether
it really is a coincidence that such-and-such person just happens to show up
at just the right moment, and this wonder can add to the enjoyment of the
novel.56 No doubt, some people will dislike this kind of story and experience,
but not taking note of the phenomenology would be to miss an important
part of what reading and writing novels is all about. Similarly, we would be
missing some of the true multicolored mixture of mathematics and its practice
if we did not pay attention to this role for mathematical coincidence within
the practice.57
Clearly, I have not offered a theory of mathematical coincidence here. The
beginnings of an account derived from the observations made so far, however,
might take the following form. The point of talk of coincidence in mathemat-
ics from a “Pascalian” perspective is to marshall attention and interest in a
group of mathematical facts by drawing attention to their indeterminacy (i.e.,
as a site for inquiry). That being the case, a deflationary/non-representational
story about coincidence-talk suggests itself.58 To call a collection of facts a
coincidence can be taken to do the work of suggesting that these facts con-
stitute a location of inquiry that’s not worth investigating. To say that the
facts are an interesting coincidence would be to indicate that although they’re
not worth further investigation, the facts seen together are nevertheless re-
markable. To say, instead, that some facts are no coincidence would be to say
that the facts are a site of indeterminacy that is (or—in the case of estab-
lished connections—was) worthy of further investigation. It’s being true or
false that some facts are a coincidence would then likely be given a deflation-
ary story derived from these facts about usage. An account of this kind would
further argue that facts about the use of ‘coincidence’ talk in mathematics
and what coincidences are aren’t separable and that the former facts provide
us with all there is to know about the later.59 Although this “account” is
quite sketchy, what it does do is capture and highlight the important roles
the apparently strange phenomenon of mathematical coincidence plays within
56 Cf. [Dannenberg(2008), 155]: “It would probably be difficult to discover a novelist more
consummate in the art of coincidence than Dickens.”
57 See [Wittgenstein(1956/1983), III §46, emphasis in the original]: “[M]athematics is a
multicoloured mixture of techniques of proof.”
58 See, e.g., [Williams(2010)] for a general framework for offering an explanation of meaning
in terms of use along these lines. See [Pérez Carballo(2016)] on a non-representational view
of mathematics as a whole.
59 A full theory might proceed by providing more explicit rules for “introducing” and
“eliminating” coincidence-talk; explaining how coincidence-claims embed in non-asserted
contexts; etc. There seem to be ample tools and methods available for filling in some of
these details if one were so inclined. Cf. [Thomasson(2020), Ch. 3] for a similar approach to
handling talk of necessity and possibility especially in the area of metaphysics.
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the practice of mathematics, in particular the role these coincidences play in
inducing indeterminacy and as sources of newness in inquiry. My hope is that
through the presentation of these roles and facts the phenomenon needn’t feel
so strange anymore—that is, that some of our philosophical puzzlement has
been dissolved—and that some insight into mathematics and its practice has
been achieved at the same time.
Let me emphasize one key characteristic of mathematical coincidence as I
have described the phenomenon here though before moving on to discuss the
most obvious objections to the view, which arise in relation to this character-
istic. Calling a collection of facts a mathematical coincidence or not, according
to the Pascalian view presented here, primarily engages one in evaluating it as
being uninteresting or worthy of attention, respectively. This being the case,
its being true that some mathematical fact, say, is a coincidence shouldn’t
be understood in terms of the world of mathematics providing a truthmaker
for this claim.60 Rather, if we’re to talk about truth at all here (it will be of
secondary importance to this sort of account in any case), to say that it’s true
that X is just a coincidence is to do no more than agree that X isn’t worthy of
special attention.61 To say that it’s true that X is no coincidence is similarly
merely to put it forward as something worthy of our mathematical attention.
5 Comparison with Lange’s Account
The understanding of mathematical coincidence discussed so far contrasts
most directly with the account given by Marc Lange, which is the most de-
veloped in the literature.62 Probably the most important contrast with the
Pascalian approach outlined above is that Lange’s analysis takes talk of co-
incidence in mathematics to be essentially descriptive.63 I’ll consider Lange’s
view in this section and another objection to the general Pascalian viewpoint
in the next in order to further elaborate the approach on offer and respond to
the most obvious objections to it.
Just as we had to find an understanding of ‘indeterminacy’ that could
make sense in the setting of mathematics in Section 2, Lange’s account can
be seen as first finding a mathematical sense of ‘coincidence’ by modifying
a more general definition of the term. The account moves from The Oxford
English Dictionary ’s definition of ‘coincidence’ as “[a] notable concurrence of
events or circumstances having no apparent causal connection,”64 to the con-
sidered view by analyzing ‘notable’ as sharing a noteworthy, mathematically
60 Cf. [Floyd(2012), 232] for a similar claim about surprises in mathematics from a
Wittgenstein-inspired perspective.
61 X may be worthy of attention for other reasons, of course.
62 See [Lange(2017)], Part III and especially Chapter 8.
63 Cf. [Lange(2017), 304]: That some theorem is no coincidence “is a fact about mathemat-
ics no less than that the theorem holds.” Whether or not this thought can only be captured
by an account like Lange’s depends on how robustly we want to understand the concept of
a “fact.” See, e.g., [Price(2011), §4].
64 “coincidence, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 25 March 2021.
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“salient” or “natural” property,65 substituting “a collection of mathematical
facts” in for “concurrent events or circumstances,” and suggesting that the
analogue of “having no apparent causal connection” is “lacking a common,
unified explanation.”66 After these adjustments we arrive at the following.
For a collection of mathematical facts, it is a coincidence that they are
all true iff the facts share a common, salient property but there is no
single, unified explanation why.67
This definition makes use of the concept of a single, unified mathematical
explanation,68 and so can’t be fully understood without some basic idea of
what such a thing is supposed to be. However, given that the worries I’ll raise
in this section don’t depend in any crucial way on the fine details of a theory
of mathematical explanation, the simple idea that explanatory proofs—proofs
demonstrating why a theorem holds rather than that it does—provide us with
mathematical explanations should suffice.69
Before objecting to this account, it must be admitted that it seems like it’s
getting at something correct and interesting, and that it can accommodate
many of the observations covered in the previous sections as well. E.g., what
else makes it merely a coincidence that the thirteenth digit of π and e is 9 if
not the fact that there’s no unified explanation of that fact? And isn’t it the
belief that there is a unified explanation to be found that drives one to inves-
tigate apparent coincidences in the hopes of discovering fruitful mathematics?
Despite this appeal and success, however, the following reasons suggest that
there is still room for alternative views.
The first concern stems from the fact that Lange’s understanding of math-
ematical coincidence seems not to mesh well with at least some of the things
mathematicians themselves have said about coincidence in mathematics. For
example, some of the examples in Philip Davis’s original article on mathemat-
ical coincidence do not seem to fit Lange’s account without a bit of forcing.
Davis shows, e.g., that it’s no coincidence that the first time
√
1141y2 + 1 is an
integer is when y is greater than 1025. For this to count as a non-coincidence
on Lange’s account, we have to identify a collection of mathematical facts and
then some salient feature shared by all of them. A unified explanatory proof
that shows why all of these facts have this property then shows why bearing it
is no coincidence. The best candidates for the mathematical facts making up
65 Cf. [Lange(2017), 277]
66 See [Lange(2010), 316-322] and [Baker(2009), 141].
67 Given an account like this, an alternative to the line I’m pursuing here, but that would be
congenial to the general outlook, might be to follow [Locke(2020)] in his account of “meta-
physical explanation for modal normativists” and use Lange’s definition of ‘coincidence’
along with a non-descriptive story about non-causal explanation.
68 The qualification, “single, unified,” aims to prevent one from claiming that by putting
together an explanatory proof of A and an explanatory proof of B one has given an expla-
nation for A and B.
69 For more detailed accounts, see, e.g., [Steiner(1978)], [Kitcher(1989)], or [Lange(2017)].
For worries about having mathematical explanation focus only on explanatory proofs, see
[Lange(2018)] and [D’Alessandro(2020a)].
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this non-coincidence seem to be the following: (1) when y = 1,
√
1141y2 + 1
isn’t an integer; (2) when y = 2,
√
1141y2 + 1 isn’t an integer; (3) when y = 3,√
1141y2 + 1 isn’t an integer; . . .. The question is then whether or not to in-
clude the fact that when y = 30693385322764657197397208,
√
1141y2 + 1 is
an integer in this list. If it is included, then the shared property, which seems to
be “y’s not being an integer when substituted into
√
1141y2 + 1” is no longer
shared by all the facts. (And it’s maybe a stretch to consider this property as
being mathematically natural in any case.) If, on the other hand, this last fact
is not included, then our explanation just shows that
√
1141y2 + 1 isn’t an in-
teger for very many small values of y. But the non-coincidence given by Davis
seems to want to account for both when
√
1141y2 + 1 isn’t an integer and
when it is one once y gets to 30693385322764657197397208. Perhaps, instead,
the shared property of each of these facts is that they all involve the expres-
sion
√
1141y2 + 1—Davis’s explanation does appeal to the continued fraction
expansion of
√
1141 after all. This allows the 30693385322764657197397208th
fact to be included in the list seamlessly, but, again, counting this as a math-
ematically natural property and analyzing the case in these terms feels to me
as if it’s fitting the example to the analysis rather than the other way around.
That is, the route from noting that y must grow so large before we find an
integral value of
√
1141y2 + 1 to the reason why doesn’t look like it really
requires taking special note of this massive collection of other facts or how
they’re grouped together.
William D’Alessandro raises a similar sort of concern about salience in his
investigation of proofs of quadratic reciprocity in relation to Lange’s account
of explanation, which is central to his account of mathematical coincidence.
Mathematicians clearly view [quadratic reciprocity] as mysterious and
in need of explanation, but what is its relevant outstanding [i.e., salient]
quality? I don’t think this is very obvious. Although one could probably
shoehorn the case into any or all of Lange’s three main categories, none
seems particularly natural, and none leads to the right verdicts about
proofs [D’Alessandro(2020b), 39].
Lange himself, being one of the excellent practitioners of “practice-first” phi-
losophy of mathematics, of course wouldn’t want to do any shoehorning to fit a
case to his account, and there may be a way to make these examples fit the the-
ory more snugly, but if mathematical coincidences can be understood at least
largely apart from a theory of explanation as with a Pascalian-type account,
perhaps some of these difficulties can be preemptively avoided. And given that
mathematicians’ assessments of the explanatory value of proofs don’t always
turn out as we’d expect them to, doing without the theory of explanation here
might actually be the safest bet. Consider, e.g., the recent study [Mej́ıa-Ramos
et al.(2021)].70 The authors asked a group of mathematicians to evaluate var-
ious proofs of the proposition “[i]f x3 − 6x2 + 11x − 6 = 2x − 2, then x = 1
or x = 4” for explanatory value, which they did without trouble. As the au-
70 See also [Inglis and Aberdein(2015)] for a similar kind of study.
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thors note in §5 of their paper, however, this gives us at least some reason to
question the adequacy of an account like Lange’s since his view “predicts that
if [a] result exhibits no noteworthy feature, then to demand an explanation of
why it holds, not merely a proof that it holds, makes no sense” [Lange(2017),
255].71
Not only do some purported examples of mathematical coincidence not
seem to fit naturally with Lange’s account, but also both Davis and the math-
ematician E. H. Moore (surprisingly) suggest what is essentially the exact
opposite of this view. They both claim that, “The existence of [a] coincidence
implies the existence of an explanation”72; that is, once you see something in-
teresting or unexpected going on, you’re going to be able to find an explanation
for it in some way. Lange’s account says that coincidence implies that there is
no explanation though, so clearly both can’t be correct. The way Davis and
Moore speak of coincidences as having explanations may seem unusual, but it
is paralleled to some extent in ordinary discourse as well. If coincidences by
definition have no explanation, “There’s no explanation for this coincidence,”
would be tautologous, and something of the form, “X explains the coinci-
dence,” would be contradictory. I take it that neither statement is tautologous
or contradictory, however. Certainly, one might suggest that it would be more
careful to say, “X explains the apparent coincidence,” in the latter case, but
even if this were so, the fact that “X explains the coincidence” isn’t nonsense,
in combination with the claims of Davis and Moore from before, ought to pro-
vide some evidence against Lange’s view and is more readily accounted for by
an account like the Pascalian one discussed above.73
Finally, given all the roles mathematical coincidences were seen to play in
Section 4, we should ask an account of mathematical coincidence to provide us
with some explanation of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of various
attitudes towards the facts involved in purported coincidences. For example,
if a mathematician thinks that some collection of facts is merely coincidental
and then spends the next five years investigating these same facts, something
seems to have gone wrong. Similarly, if a mathematician thinks, “This is no
coincidence!” and then feels no motivation at all to investigate, we might feel
as if there’s some kind of internal discord as well. According to a Pascalian
view, these attitudes and motivations are accounted for by the simple fact that
to call something a coincidence just is to have the attitude that its investiga-
tion wouldn’t be worthwhile, and similarly for the no-coincidence case. While
Lange’s account has an explanation for these attitudes as well, we might (1)
aim for an even tighter connection between the judgments and the motivation
and (2) worry about whether his account gets the order of explanation right.
71 It’s also possible, as already suggested in n.67, that substituting a different account of
explanation or modifying Lange’s could do the required work just as well.
72 See [Davis(1981), 320] and [Moore(1909)], which is cited in [Krieger(2003), 214]. Lange
makes note of this part of the Davis article in a footnote, but thinks that it would be better
interpreted in a less extreme form. See [Lange(2017), 445n.8].
73 There remain questions about how literally to take and how heavily to weigh the opinions
of mathematicians on these sorts of issues though of course. Cf. [Martin(2020), §5.2].
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First, consider the following passage where Lange responds to a view similar
to the one on offer here and also provides the material for explaining the facts
about motivation under discussion.
But it is not the case that [some facts are non-coincidental] because
they suggest further interesting mathematics.74 Rather, they suggest
further interesting mathematics because they are non-coincidences. It
is fruitful to think further about a non-coincidence because we may
thereby uncover the facts that make it no coincidence. On my account,
the reason why a genuine mathematical coincidence leads nowhere is
that there is nowhere interesting for it to lead. In particular, a coinci-
dence has no mathematical explanation; its components lack a common
proof. The reason that a coincidence is not mathematically fruitful is
that there is no explanation of it to be found [Lange(2017), 286-287].75
So, Lange’s idea here is that a mathematician who deems some facts to be
a coincidence won’t be motivated to investigate them further because if they
really are a coincidence, there’s nothing further to be found to explain them.
Similarly, someone who thinks, “That’s no coincidence,” thinks that because
they think there is an explanation to be found and so may be motivated to
try to find it by that belief.
The contrasting views of motivation in this area seem to be somewhat
analogous to the difference between the realist and the expressivist in ethics.
It has seemed to many to be obviously correct that, if you sincerely think that
you ought to give money to the ACLU each month, then you ought to be
motivated to do so in at least some way.76 Expressivism has seemed appealing
in light of this apparent connection between moral beliefs and motivation since
it suggests that the way our ethical beliefs are related to the world is different
from the way in which our other beliefs are. If one holds that moral beliefs do
something like express a person’s view of how the world ought to be rather
than having something to do with the world as it is, a ready-made story is
available about why a moral belief would automatically imply some kind of
motivation.77 On a view according to which we aim to have our beliefs about
74 This is one important way in which the Pascalian account isn’t just the account discussed
in [Lange(2017), 286]. Lange commits the view there to the claim that non-coincidences are
non-coincidental because they suggest further interesting mathematics. On a Pascalian view,
there isn’t any because playing a significant role. Further, the view in Lange is primarily a
story about what mathematical coincidences are—according to the view, they’re the facts
that don’t repay further study. The Pascalian viewpoint is, instead, primarily a story about
what we do with coincidence talk that then takes mathematical coincidences themselves to
be roughly the shadows of this talk.
75 Note that this potentially commits the view to what might be called “explanation
chauvinism”: Is it really the case that explanations are all that are sought when a coin-
cidence is investigated in mathematics? Compare with “proof chauvinism” as discussed in
[D’Alessandro(2020a)] and [Lange(2018)].
76 See [Smith(1994), 71-76] for an influential argument for this claim from someone
not moved to expressivism by this “motivation problem.” [Shafer-Landau(2000)] and
[Railton(1986)], on the other hand, object to this sort of motivational internalism.
77 See, e.g., [Schroeder(2010), Ch. 1.4].
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morality accurately represent the world in the same way we want our beliefs
about, say, crustaceans to do, this connection between motivation and belief
is not so easily accounted for. The connection can be accounted for, however,
in at least some way in the style of Lange’s account of coincidence. If I believe
supporting the arts is important, then it’s no surprise that these beliefs then
lead me to action. Given that mathematical coincidence talk doesn’t play a
role in our lives anywhere near as important as our moral discourse, it may
be thought that accounting for these facts about motivation in relation to our
understanding of the phenomenon is not so pressing. And that’s true enough,
but the considerations on each side of the realism/expressivism debate seem
to be applicable to the evaluation of a Lange-style vs. a Pascalian account of
mathematical coincidence as well. So, I claim that whatever weight one gives
to the expressivist case against realism, that same force can reasonably be
applied proportionally to the contrasting views being discussed here as well.
Second, it might be argued that the motivational account derived from
the passage from Lange above gets the order of explanation wrong. Suppose
I think that some mathematical facts are a coincidence. According to Lange’s
view, this either comes to the same thing as my thinking that there’s no unified
explanation connecting the facts or I think this because I believe there’s no
unified explanation of the facts. This belief that there’s no unified explanation
to be found is what then explains why I won’t spend time investigating the
facts. But, surely, it isn’t the fact that there’s no unified explanation connect-
ing these facts so far that leads me to call some collection of facts coincidental.
That there’s no unified explanation so far must at least further be combined
with a belief that one won’t ever be found. And the belief that a unifying
explanation won’t ever be found seems to be playing the starring role in ex-
plaining my conclusion that the facts are coincidental as well as my lack of
motivation to explore them. This belief that a unifying explanation won’t ever
be found seems to be not much more than another way of describing an eval-
uation that the investigation of these facts won’t be worthwhile. That being
the case, an account that takes this evaluation to come first, providing the
motivation and grounds for the judgment seems to put the star of the show in
the more appropriate role. Again, I don’t think this consideration is decisive,
but it arguably captures the phenomenology we’re after more accurately and
directly.
6 Does Anything Go?
I naturally expect the suggestion that whether a collection of mathematical
facts is coincidental is not determined just by what the world of mathematics
is like to meet with some resistance. Perhaps it makes sense of how coincidence
talk is used in practice; perhaps it nicely squares with judgments that coinci-
dence comes in degrees in mathematics78; and perhaps it even helps us under-
stand otherwise strange claims made by mathematicians (e.g., Davis claims
78 For the desirability of such a feature, see [Baker(2009), 148].
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that the mathematician to some extent brings mathematical coincidences into
existence—if coincidence talk is in the business of focusing attention here or
there, this seems like it might be a reasonable enough claim; if not, perhaps
not79); but surely there are facts of the matter here. Marc Lange gets at
something like this thought when he claims that “[e]ven from a mathemat-
ically omniscient perspective, there are some mathematical coincidences.”80
Isn’t someone who takes the Pascalian view described above committed to a
kind of extreme relativism here where anything goes when it comes to talking
about coincidence in mathematics?
In responding to this worry and the surrounding cluster of issues it raises
in more detail than I did in Section 4, it should first be noted that, as a mat-
ter of fact, mathematical practice does tend to converge on whether or not
something is appropriately called a coincidence. So, evidently, not just any-
thing does go here. Part of what mathematical practice does—like all other
sufficiently developed practices—is establish norms for the usage of the terms
of art, like ‘mathematical coincidence,’ within the practice.81 ‘Coincidence’ is
a term we’re all familiar with prior to any exposure to its use within mathe-
matics, but it’s important to see clearly both the similarities and differences
between our ordinary usage and the uses the word finds within mathematics.
Given the fact that to be part of the practice of mathematics is to be governed
by the professional and informal norms of that practice, to be at least largely
in line with other mathematicians’ judgments about coincidence will in part be
constitutive of being engaged in that practice. This being the case, there will
be better or worse opinions about whether particular facts are coincidences or
not, and these opinions will be judged by the standards of other practitioners.
This fact alone should go a long way towards reducing the sting of this rela-
tivist worry.82 Nevertheless, the further question that ought to be asked when
deciding how seriously to take the objection that anything like the Pascalian
view of Section 4 implies that there’s no fact of the matter about whether
something is a mathematical coincidence is, “What best explains these facts
about mathematical practice?”83
Gilbert Harman and David Wiggins have each suggested that realism (in
the metaphysical sense) is the view one should opt for when the best explana-
79 See [Davis(1981), 320]: “To some extent, [the mathematician] even brings [mathematical
coincidence] about.”
80 See [Lange(2010), 316]. According to an alternative account of explanation for which
explanations are intimately related to the answering of why-questions, this claim of Lange’s
would likely be judged to be mistaken though. E.g., [van Fraassen(1980), 130] suggests that
an omniscient being wouldn’t be in the business of explanation at all, so the distinction
between coincidence and non-coincidence in Lange’s terms would disappear.
81 See, e.g., [MacIntyre(1981), Ch. 14] on this role of practice. See [Martin(2020)] for a
general MacIntyrean pespective on mathematical practice.
82 See [Field(2001)] for a similar view in relation to his “evaluativist” account of apriority.
See also [Rosen(1994)] on the general difficulty of saying what exactly objectivity comes to
in the first place.
83 A simpler way out of the worry may be by adopting a deflationary account of what it is
for there to be “facts of the matter” in this domain. See, e.g., [Thomasson(2020), Ch. 6.1].
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tion for convergence like the one just described is the existence of a relevant
fact.84 In Harman’s examples, the convergence of a group of scientists on the
thought, “There goes a proton,” is best explained by the existence of the pro-
ton, but convergence on the thought, “Setting cats on fire is wrong,” is not
best explained by the fact that this action is wrong. Rather, this convergence
can be better explained by other psychological and sociological facts about
human beings in certain places and times. The relevant question for present
purposes is whether convergence within mathematical practice on a judgment
that, say, X is coincidence is best explained by the fact that X really is a
coincidence, whatever we ultimately take that claim to mean. My suggestion
is that the real existence of something coincidental is not what leads to the
convergence here. Instead, this convergence is explained, as suggested above,
by the shared practice governing the interests and appropriateness of certain
judgments of those making the relevant judgments. In fact, even an analysis
based on Lange’s account would seem to be committed to this view of the
explanation of convergent views about mathematical coincidence: convergence
on the view that X is no coincidence tends to happen prior to any explana-
tion being found, and since there’s generally no way to prove that A and B
can’t be given a single, unified explanation, convergence on the view that A
and B is merely coincidental can’t be reached on the basis of the fact that no
explanation of this kind will be found.
Another familiar test for whether or not a domain of discourse should
be thought of as being (metaphysically) realist is whether it exhibits what
Crispin Wright calls “cognitive command.” A domain of discourse exhibits
cognitive command, roughly, if it’s a priori that when there’s a dispute, one
side or the other is mistaken.85 According to the Pascalian view, talk about
coincidence fails to be a domain exhibiting cognitive command, but this fact
should be considered a point in its favor. For many pairs or larger collections of
mathematical facts, it doesn’t seem as if it really makes sense to ask whether
they’re coincidental or not.86 In these cases, one could insist that the facts
are either coincidental or not or one could find a way to raise the question of
whether they’re coincidental meaningfully, but there’s nothing like an a priori
certainty that one side or the other must be mistaken given this imagined
insistence or that an answer about the raised question must be reachable.
These responses to the worry that anything goes with mathematical co-
incidence talk as far as the Pascalian view is concerned are brief, and the
back-and-forth could obviously be extended (indefinitely). However, I take it
that the general line of response presented so far is enough to both show the
Pascalian view not to have clearly unacceptable consequences and to indi-
cate how this further conversation could be continued for those interested in
carrying on.
84 See, e.g., [Harman(1977), Ch. 1.3] and [Wiggins(1987), 147, 149-151].
85 [Wright(1992), 92-93]
86 This fact about arbitrary collections of mathematical facts is also noted by Lange and
accounted for by his view. See, e.g., [Lange(2017), 280].
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7 Conclusion
One’s view of the world and coincidences in it appears to be determined to
a large degree by one’s intuitive ideas about how the world works. If I think
that good things generally come to those who wait, I might not find it coinci-
dental that my patience is so often rewarded. If I have no idea about how the
world and occurrences in it are governed, nearly anything could be deemed a
coincidence: the sun’s rising two days in a row might be a shock; the milk’s
going bad after being left out in the sun might be baffling; etc. The world of
mathematics is one that we’re often in the position of not knowing our way
about very well and of not having an intuitive understanding that allows us to
see certain things as expected or not. This is especially true when we’re trying
to break into unknown and not yet determinately settled parts of the subject
while new research is underway. It’s no surprise, then, that we seem to find
coincidences so often in this domain. As we come to have hunches or insights
or intuitions about how a particular corner of the world of mathematics works
and is governed, we aim to remove our feelings of uncertainty, indeterminacy,
and confusion by transforming the coincidences we find there from surprises
into trivialities.87 By focusing on how talk of mathematical coincidence func-
tions within normal mathematical practice, I hope to have shed some light
on how this talk and these judgments push us forward in the quest for un-
derstanding and the (temporary) conquering of indeterminacy in the domain
mathematics.
References
[Aberdein(2010)] Aberdein A (2010) Observations on Sick Mathematics. In: van Kerkhove
B, van Bendegem JP, de Vuyst J (eds) Philosophical Perspectives on Mathematical
Practice, College Publications
[Alighieri(2007)] Alighieri D (2007) Paradiso. Anchor Books
[Artin(1991)] Artin M (1991) Algebra. Prentice Hall
[Augustine(1961)] Augustine (1961) Confessions. Penguin Books
[Axler(1997)] Axler S (1997) Linear Algebra Done Right. Springer-Verlag
[Baker(2009)] Baker A (2009) Mathematical accidents and the end of explanation. In: Bueno
O, Linnebo Ø (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, Palgrave Macmillan
[Barnes and Williams(2011)] Barnes E, Williams JRG (2011) A theory of metaphysical in-
determinacy. In: Bennett K, Zimmerman D (eds) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6,
Oxford University Press
[Bartle and Sherbert(2011)] Bartle R, Sherbert D (2011) Introduction to Real Analysis.
John Wiley & Sons
[Bourbaki(1968)] Bourbaki N (1968) Theory of Sets. Addison-Wesley
[Bromberger(1992)] Bromberger S (1992) On What We Know We Don’t Know: Explana-
tion, Theory, Linguistics, and How Questions Shape Them. The University of Chicago
Press
[Brookfield(2016)] Brookfield G (2016) The coefficients of cyclotomic polynomials. Mathe-
matics Magazine 89(3):179–188
87 Cf. [Rota(1997), 93]: “The quest for ultimate triviality is characteristic of the mathe-
matical enterprise.”
Indeterminacy, Coincidence, and “Sourcing Newness” in Mathematical Research 23
[Buchbinder and Zaslavsky(2011)] Buchbinder O, Zaslavsky O (2011) Is this a coincidence?
The role of examples in fostering a need for proof. ZDM Mathematics Education 43:269–
281
[Burgess et al.(2020)Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett] Burgess A, Cappelen H, Plunkett D
(eds) (2020) Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford University Press
[Conway and Norton(1979)] Conway JH, Norton S (1979) Monstrous moonshine. Bulletin
of the London Mathematical Society 11(3):308–339
[Corfield(2003)] Corfield D (2003) Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics. Cambridge
University Press
[D’Alessandro(2020a)] D’Alessandro W (2020a) Mathematical explanation beyond explana-
tory proof. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71(2):581–603
[D’Alessandro(2020b)] D’Alessandro W (2020b) Proving quadratic reciprocity: Explana-
tion, disagreement, transparency and depth. Synthese pp 1–44
[Dannenberg(2008)] Dannenberg H (2008) Coincidence and Counterfactuality: Plotting
Time and Space in Narrative Fiction. University of Nebraska Press
[Davis(1981)] Davis P (1981) Are there coincidences in mathematics? American Mathemat-
ical Monthly 88(5):311–320
[Dewey(1938)] Dewey J (1938) Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Henry Holt and Company
[Diaconis and Mosteller(1989)] Diaconis P, Mosteller F (1989) Methods for studying coin-
cidences. Journal of the American Statistical Association 84.408:853–861
[Dummit and Foote(2004)] Dummit D, Foote R (2004) Abstract Algebra. John Wiley &
Sons
[Eldridge and Sagong(1988)] Eldridge KE, Sagong S (1988) The determination of kaprekar
convergence and loop convergence of all three-digit numbers. The American Mathemat-
ical Monthly 95(2):105–112
[Field(2001)] Field H (2001) Apriority as an evaluative notion. In: Truth and the Absence
of Fact, Oxford University Press
[Fine(1994)] Fine K (1994) Essence and modality: The second philosophical perspectives
lecture. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1–16
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[Hutter and Faŕıas(2017)] Hutter M, Faŕıas I (2017) Sourcing newness: Ways of inducing
indeterminacy. Journal of Cultural Economy 10(5):434–449
[Inglis and Aberdein(2015)] Inglis M, Aberdein A (2015) Beauty is not simplicity: An anal-
ysis of mathematicians’ proof appraisals. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 23(1):87–109
[Jones(1998)] Jones V (1998) A credo of sorts. In: Dales H, Oliveri G (eds) Truth in Math-
ematics, Clarendon Press
[Kaprekar(1955)] Kaprekar D (1955) An interesting property of the number 6174. Scripta
Mathematica 21:304
24 James V. Martin
[Kitcher(1989)] Kitcher P (1989) Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the
world. In: Kitcher P, Salmon W (eds) Scientific Explanation, v. 13, Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press
[Krieger(2003)] Krieger M (2003) Doing Mathematics: Convention, Subject, Calculation,
Analogy. World Scientific
[Lakatos(1976)] Lakatos I (1976) Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Dis-
covery. Cambridge University Press
[Lange(2010)] Lange M (2010) What are mathematical coincidences (and why does it mat-
ter)? Mind 119(474):307–340
[Lange(2017)] Lange M (2017) Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science
and Mathematics. Oxford University Press
[Lange(2018)] Lange M (2018) Mathematical explanations that are not proofs. Erkenntnis
83(8):1–18
[Lewis(1986)] Lewis D (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Basil Blackwell
[Locke(2020)] Locke T (2020) Metaphysical explanations for modal normativists. Meta-
physics 3(1):33–54
[Mac Lane and Birkhoff(1999)] Mac Lane S, Birkhoff G (1999) Algebra. AMS Chelsea Pub-
lishing
[MacIntyre(1981)] MacIntyre A (1981) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University
of Notre Dame Press
[Martin(2020)] Martin JV (2020) Prolegomena to virtue-theoretic studies in the philosophy
of mathematics. Synthese pp 1–26
[Martin and Pease(2013)] Martin U, Pease A (2013) What does MathOverflow tell us about
the production of mathematics? https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.0904
[Mej́ıa-Ramos et al.(2021)Mej́ıa-Ramos, Evans, Rittberg, and Inglis] Mej́ıa-Ramos JP,
Evans T, Rittberg C, Inglis M (2021) Mathematicians’ assessments of the explanatory
value of proofs. Axiomathes
[Moore(1909)] Moore EH (1909) On a form of general analysis with applications to linear
differential and integral equations. In: Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale dei Matem-
atici (Roma, 6-11 Aprile 1908), v.2, Tipografia della R. Accademia dei Lincei
[Muntersbjorn(2003)] Muntersbjorn M (2003) Representational innovation and mathemat-
ical ontology. Synthese 134(1/2):159–180
[Nishiyama(2012)] Nishiyama Y (2012) The weirdness of number 6174. International Jour-
nal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 80.3:363–373
[Pascal(1658/2000)] Pascal B (1658/2000) De l’esprit géométrique et de l’art de persuader.
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